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8 April 1966

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY TOWARD THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

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THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

by

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SUMMARY

China places great importance on the role of the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, in the success of the world revolution which is eventually to bring Communism to all world nations. She feels that the revolutionary struggles of these countries will eventually create an environment under which the capitalist nations, the United States and the nations of Western Europe, will eventually succumb to the World Revolution. The Islamic nations of North Africa and the Middle East are an important segment of this underdeveloped world in which China has a special interest. These nations have histories and characteristics which require a division into geographical areas to facilitate examination.

The Arab Middle East has been the region of greatest unrest and tensions between the states. Almost all have gained independence from colonialism since World War II. The growth of Israel has been a major irritant and the determination of the Arab states to eliminate Israel is the foremost factor which unites these nations today. The long struggle with colonialism, now almost ended, made significant contributions to interstate tensions in past years. Earlier attempts to achieve political union, long an Arab dream, have largely given way to more peaceful co-existence between the states, improved rapport between the monarchies and the republics, and a common unity in the determination to eliminate Israel. The Cold War competition between the United States and Russia also exacerbated Arab relationships in the years when these great powers were less subtle in their approach. Until about 1958, American influence rapidly decreased and Russian influence rose. American influence rose and Russian prestige fell during the period from 1958 to 1963. Since then, both nations have gradually improved their image in the Arab world by more careful maneuverings. The threat of Russian Communism was eliminated largely at Arab initiative, and it is not a significant presence in these Arab nations. Nasser emerged and has remained the dominant leader in this area. The most significant political movement, other than Nasserism, is the Baath Party. It resembles the Communist Party in many ways, but rejects Communism as an alien ideology and has mercilessly suppressed Communism.

The North African states are comparatively free of interstate tensions. They are generally Western-oriented, although Algeria professes non-alignment because of her dependence on both Russian and Western Aid. None are very involved in the political relationships of Egypt and the Arab Middle East.

The Northern Tier states, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, also have few interstate problems. Turkey and Iran are allied with the West. Afghanistan receives aid from both East and West. Her proximity to Russia places her largely in the Russian sphere, although she claims neutrality.

China has made a strong effort to increase her prestige and influence in all these countries, while concurrently lowering Russian and American influence. She seeks to establish formal diplomatic relations with all of them, and has done so with the great majority. She has not been successful with the two most powerful states, Turkey and Iran, and certain Arab states heavily orientated to the West economically. China carefully avoids interference in local affairs and criticism of any leaders. She strongly supports the Arab cause against Israel. She gave limited material support to the Algerian war for independence, and has supported revolts against the British in the Aden Protectorate. She has provided limited economic aid to selected countries, using grants and long-term loans with little or no interest. There are indications that she attempts to penetrate local parties, Communist or leftist, with the Chinese ideology. She may have made a significant encroachment into the Baathist Party, now ruling Syria. China has not promoted unrest and tensions, merely to create chaos. It is more likely that she avoids such actions because detection would arouse suspicion and lower her prestige.

Although China has been successful in achieving formal relations with most of these countries, and has had other minor successes, analysis indicates that she has not made significant gains in the Islamic countries as a whole. No Islamic country has sided with China in her ideological struggle with Russia, and none shows signs of deliberately antagonizing the United States. The recent failure of the Algiers Afro-Asian Conference showed that these nations were unwilling to serve as pawns in the ideological struggle with Russia. China's image has suffered because of her aggression against India, and her credit for the abortive Indonesian rebellion. Finally, China has little to offer other than words and slogans. This is poor competition for the material aid provided by Russia and the United States.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the "rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encroachment of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole course of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹

Thus Lin Piao states the Chinese belief that revolutionary struggles in the world's underdeveloped nations will create the environment needed to strangle the capitalist powers, much like the Communists achieved victory in China itself. He commits China to support these revolutionary struggles which are to bring world victory to the Chinese Communist ideology.

This study examines political, social and economic aspects of the Islamic nations from Morocco to Afghanistan to determine the factors which encourage Chinese Communist penetration and exploitation.

¹"Lin Piao Article Commemorating V.J. Day Anniversary, 'Long Live the Victory of the Peoples' War'." Daily Report Supplement, Far East, No. 171 (4S), 3 Sep. 1965, p. 22.

Concurrently, it analyzes political relationships and cleavages among the Islamic countries, and between these countries and both East and West. The effects of these relationships on Chinese national strategy are established.

It early becomes apparent that the diversity of the area requires regional division to facilitate intelligent examination. The Northern Tier states (Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan) differ markedly in history and outlook from the Arab lands; they are not in fact Arab countries. The Arab countries also display characteristics which favor subdivision into two regions. Egypt and the Arab states to its east strongly interact with each other. On the other hand, the North African Islamic states have a lower level of interstate impact and their relationships to the other Arab states are not as close as the Arab heritage might imply.

Therefore a regional examination will first be made, starting with the area bounded by Egypt, the Arabian states, and the Fertile Crescent states. This will be followed by an examination of the North African states and the Northern Tier states. After the regional discussion is completed, the panorama of Islamic countries as seen by the Chinese policy maker will be discussed. This will serve both to summarize the situation and motivations in the Islamic countries and to provide a vantage point for development of a Chinese policy toward these nations. Finally the effectiveness of China's foreign policy toward these countries will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

EGYPT AND THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

These states, which include the Sudan for this discussion, constitute a region of great political activity and the interactions between them are the highest of all the Arab states. They have emerged as a major area of competition for influence by both the East and the West. Their strategic importance is great because they dominate direct routes from Europe to the Middle East and Asia, and they possess the world's greatest oil reserves. The Islamic religion is centered here. It is a region of frequent coups, general unrest, and ever changing relationships between states. These relationships have been very complex since the vast majority gained independence during and after World War II. Egypt and the major states of the Fertile Crescent (Iraq and Syria), form a political center with Egypt in a predominant role. Attempts toward a lasting union are characteristic of these three, and their external politics and relationships partially explain problems which arise in peripheral states. Jordan, in the middle, is strongly affected. Egyptian actions in the Yemen area have heavily involved Saudi Arabia in recent years. The Sudan is least affected by these regional political struggles. All these states are greatly concerned with the Palestine question. This chapter will cover briefly the factors which shape the characteristics of the states in each region. This will be followed by a discussion of the political dynamics resulting

from interstate relationships and the influences of Eastern and Western competition.

EGYPT AND THE FERTILE CRESCENT

Egypt is politically one of the most stable Arab states, despite its tremendous social problems. Abdul Nasser has ruled this country strongly and uninterrupted since he assumed full powers in 1955. He has been, for all practical purposes, the ruler from the time of the 1952 coup which overthrew King Farouk. He personifies Arab unity, such as it is, with a strong following in most Arab countries. At home he rules 28 million people in one of the most crowded, disease-ridden areas of the world. The birth rate, one of the world's highest, creates a severe population growth problem in a sorely limited habitable area.¹ He has aggressively attacked the poverty, disease and ignorance which beset his country.² Living standards are still among the world's lowest in spite of his efforts. Nevertheless, he commands great loyalty among his people who are beginning to see improvement in their lot.³

Syria, with four million people on five times Egypt's habitable lands, has no population problem. However, its religious sectionalism, regional jealousies, and competing social, political, and economic

¹Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, pp. 217-218.

²John S. Badeau, "A Crisis in Confidence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Jan. 1965, p. 281.

³Grant C. Butler, Beyond Arabian Sands, p. 72.

interests cause great instability.⁴ Three coups occurred in 1949, and several changes thereafter led to fear of a Communist takeover by 1958. In that year, the Baathist Party negotiated with Egypt to establish the United Arab Republic which lasted until the 1961 coup. Another coup occurred in 1962, and yet another in 1963 to install the present Baathist government under General Hafez. An attempted union with Egypt and Iraq in 1963 was unsuccessful. The present government, very Marxist in appearance, has alienated both Egypt and Iraq.⁵ The country is torn by rioting which is strongly suppressed by the Baathist government.⁶

Iraq, a nation of six and a half million people, is also a turbulent country. Poverty is widespread and feudalistic land practices still exist.⁷ Its oil riches have not yet brought great improvement in social conditions. About one and a half million Kurds have been in intermittent revolt against the government since 1962 and have thus far successfully resisted military pacification attempts. A pro Western monarchy, the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact, was overthrown by military coup in 1958, and King Faisal, a cousin of Hussein of Jordan, was killed. A new government, Communist oriented, ruled with a reign of terror under General Kassem

⁴Don Peretz, op. cit., pp. 342-343.

⁵Joe Alex Morris, "Stormy Syria-Arab World's Odd Man Out," Washington Post, 25 Jul. 1964, p. E4.

⁶Dana Adams Schmidt, "Damascus Faces Rising Hostility," New York Times, 23 Apr. 1964, p. 6.

⁷Alan L. Otten, "Middle East Turmoil," The Wall Street Journal, 11 Feb. 1963, p. 1.

until it was overthrown in 1962.⁸ The Baathist Party seized power in 1963, vainly sought union with Egypt and Syria, and was overthrown in 1964 by the present government. This new government is working to repair the economic damage wrought by the Kassem and later regimes. It is becoming increasingly Egyptian oriented in outlook and actions, and there are indications of imminent union or close alliance with Egypt.⁹

Jordan, with a population of one and a half million, is the only nation in the Fertile Crescent ruled by a monarch, King Hassein. His population includes 500,000 Palestine refugees who are more sophisticated socially and politically than the native Jordanians. These people are a hotbed of resentment and unrest. The country has been described as "an artificial creation, economically unviable and politically unstable."¹⁰ The king has, in past years, been subjected to numerous propaganda attacks by Egypt and neighboring states, as well as rioting by mobs favoring union with adjoining states. However, he is now favorably regarded, and the present government is the best Jordan has had in recent years.¹¹

Lebanon, when compared to other Arab states in the Fertile Crescent, is a sea of tranquility. Its two and a half million people

⁸"Communist Influence Widespread In Iraq," New York Times, 5 Apr. 1959, p. E5.

⁹Thomas F. Brady, "Iraq and U.A.R. Are Drawing Closer," New York Times, 18 Nov. 1965, p. 8.

¹⁰Joe Alex Morris, "It's Those Outsiders Who Are Jarring Jordan," Washington Post, 31 Oct. 1965, p. E4.

¹¹Joe Alex Morris, "It's Those Outsiders Who Are Jarring Jordan," Washington Post, 31 Oct. 1965, p. E4.

have a relatively high standard of living and enjoy good government and schools.¹² Its only latent problem is a government delicately balanced along religious lines between the roughly fifty-fifty split of Muslims and Christians.¹³ The Muslims constitute a potential threat to stability because they may grow to suspect that they are under-represented.

THE ARABIAN STATES

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both monarchies, are very stable politically. Both have been enriched by oil revenues from the Western operated oil companies.

The Emir Abdullah transformed Kuwait, a small nation of 468,000 people on 6000 square miles of land into the most prosperous Arab state. He used billions to create an Arab welfare state with elaborate schools, free medical care, and low cost housing. A recent transition of power to the new Emir Sabah occurred when the Emir Abdullah died. Kuwait operates its own carefully administered aid program, which has extended millions of dollars in aid to other Arab countries.¹⁴

In Saudi Arabia, King Faisal recently assumed full power after exercising dominant influence since 1958. He is determined to institute sound economic development. Several years ago he provided

¹²Grant C. Butler, op. cit., p. 141

¹³William R. Frye, "Lebanon: Story Behind the Headlines," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 38, 1 Nov. 1958, p. 1.

¹⁴Ragali El Malbach, "Economic Development Through Cooperation: The Kuwait Fund," Middle East Journal, Vol. 18, Autumn, 1964, p. 405.

social security, free medical care, and schooling to the people. He has eliminated the spend thrift subsidies to friends and relatives which brought criticism to his predecessor, King ibn Saud.¹⁵ There is no indication of significant unrest in either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.

Yemen, on the southwest coast, is a different story. This nation of five million people in the most fertile part of the peninsula has been torn by civil war since the Imam was overthrown in 1962. The Republican government, aided by 50,000 Egyptian troops, has been unable to suppress the guerrilla war waged by rebellious tribesmen who support the Imam. These guerrilla forces have received aid from Saudi Arabia and far away Iran.¹⁶ An uneasy truce, negotiated by Nasser and King Faisal without Yemeni participation, has held the peace for several months while the Yemenis try to negotiate a settlement. Poverty and disease were rampant, taxes were exorbitant and economic chaos reigned supreme in the deposed monarchy.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the Yemeni tribesmen have fought furiously to preserve the religious based Imamate, and they now control most of the northern area.

The Federation of South Arabia, the last British protectorate in the Arab states, is also a hotbed of unrest. There are about 100,000 people in Aden and 650,000 in thirty sultanates bound to England by

¹⁵George Rentz, "Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Island," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, p. 81.

¹⁶"Iran Reported Arming Yemen Royalist Forces," The Washington Post, 28 Feb. 1965, p. A5.

¹⁷William R. Brown, "The Yemeni Dilemma," Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, Autumn, 1963, p. 349.

treaty. Rioting and strife are rampant, and several British officials have been assassinated. In retaliation, the British have suspended the constitution, and subdued riots by strong military force. Meanwhile, intelligent planning for the promised independence in 1968 is stymied by the rebellion and the vested interests of Aden politicians who fear the voting power of the Sheikdoms.¹⁸

THE SUDAN

The Sudan, unlike Egypt to the north, is very strife-ridden. Three million Negroid pagans, in a southern area the size of France, oppose rule by the seven million Arabs of the north. Armed rebels effectively control the entire region, despite the efforts of three-quarters of the 20,000 man Sudanese army, which is hampered by low morale and poor equipment.¹⁹ General Abhoud overthrew the constitutional government in 1958 and established an authoritarian regime. His conservative government faced rising unrest, riotings and opposition by the middle classes, and he was overthrown in 1964. The new government is faced with the continuing southern rebellion, low army morale, a dissident civil service, and increasing movement of frustrated intellectuals into the Communist Party.²⁰ Recently riots erupted because the Parliament outlawed the Communist Party, and threatened the seats of eight Communist deputies.²¹

¹⁸Patrick Seale (London Observer), "Rocky Road Seen Ahead for Aden," The Washington Post, 8 Feb. 1965, p. C10.

¹⁹"Officers Mutiny in Sudan Is Bared," New York Times, 12 Dec. 1965, p. 9.

²⁰Hedrick Smith, "Race, Economies, Politics - All Trouble Sudan," New York Times, 19 Dec. 1965, p. E4.

²¹Hedrick Smith, "Sudan Reds Rise and Fall In A Year," New York Times, 19 Dec. 1965, p. 24.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

These Arab states are the scene of a myriad of conflicting forces and emotions. Some attest to their common pan-Arab interests, language and religion, and promote unity of action. Other forces, most notably their individual nationalisms, frustrate this unity. Egypt and the Fertile Crescent states are the most active politically and their relationships are the most unstable. Nasserism is a powerful force throughout the area, and he is the dominant leader of Arab unity. Although he leads, he deals with followers who are frequently reluctant. Most of these states have achieved independence from partial or complete colonialism in the years since World War II; only Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been free of Western colonialism. A remnant of colonialism still exists in the Aden area. These nations are emerging under conditions which, already difficult, are further aggravated by the Cold War maneuvers of the East and West. The ensuing discussion will cover the major issues which affect the political behavior of these nations.

THE PALESTINE ISSUE

In 1948, Israel emerged as a state. Within weeks, she administered a stinging defeat to the Arab nations who promptly attacked her. Almost a million Arab refugees emerged from Palestine because of this war and the preceding terrorism; 500,000 of these refugees are still United Nations charges. In Western eyes, Israel is a

small state of two and one-half million people, occupying an inconsequential 8000 square miles of Middle East land. Israel is far more than this to the Arabs:

Theirs is the traditional Zionist image of a Jewist state, embracing the loyalty and full political, material and moral support of world Jewry. In Arab eyes she is a powerful colossus, influential in the hierarchies of the world's great powers. . . . To the Arabs, world Zionism is as menacing a threat as Communism.²²

Abdul Nasser has said:

The only solution to the Palestine problem is to let the Arab refugees go back to the land. Then there will be 1,200,000 Arabs and 1,800,000 Jews. There will no longer be Israel, a religious state, but simply Palestine, which is what it should be. We cannot live with a religious state.²³

Most Arab leaders today are united in their determination to eliminate Israel. A Palestine Liberation Organization has been established. The concomitant Palestine Liberation Army will require a careful four-year buildup to make ready for the attack. Syria demands an immediate attack. Jordan and Lebanon, with the most to lose, prefer the careful Nasser approach. Recently the Arab states solemnly agreed to call a truce in their feuds in order to concentrate their energies against the common enemy, Israel.²⁴

Western colonialism receives full credit for the emergence of Israel, and the continued Western support for Israel is a major

²²Don Peretz, op. cit., p. 296.

²³Abdul Nasser, as quoted by Don Peretz, op. cit., p. 151.

²⁴Stephen Hughes, "Arabs Delay Israel 'War' For Four Years," Washington Post, 19 Sep. 1965, p. A24.

force which injures friendly relations. All Middle Eastern Arab nations broke diplomatic relations with West Germany when she established formal diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965. The stigma of past British and French colonialism, the memory of the attack on the Suez Canal, and recall of American intervention in Lebanon may recede in time, but Western support for Israel is a continuing thorn in the side of Arab-Western relations.

THE STRUGGLE WITH COLONIALISM

Dislike of the French and British persists because of their long dominance of these Arab states and the long struggle, not yet over, to end it. The secret Sikes-Picot agreements during World War I provided the basis for the division of the Arab Middle East into the French and British colonies and the mandates which emerged. The callous post-war division of the spoils and the establishment of politically expedient borders destroyed the unity which had existed under Ottoman rule. Another set of agreements had led Arab leaders into rebellion against the Turkish empire. They offered the inducement of a unified Arab nation free of Turkish rule. Whatever the truth of the allegations concerning the intent of the Balfour Declaration, which vaguely promised a Jewish "home" in the hope of arousing Jewish support for the Allied cause, the fact remains that the declaration and the secret agreements set a chain of events in motion to establish Western colonialism, and an eventual Jewish state on Arab soil. The Arabs were not consulted.²⁵

²⁵For a thorough discussion, see Don Peretz, op.cit., pp. 105-116.

The unrest and rebellions against the colonial masters marked a nationalistic rise which could not be resisted after World War II by the weakened European powers. France was out of Lebanon and Syria by late 1946. England abandoned Palestine in 1947, leaving a vacuum into which Israel was born. The revolutionary government of Egypt saw the last of the British "colonial" army in July, 1956, only to have it return briefly later the same year as a part of the abortive Suez invasion. That same year, rioting greeted indications that Jordan would join the Baghdad Pact and Hussein saved his throne by ejecting General Glubb, leader of the Arab Legion. Iraq became the only Arab nation to join the Baghdad Pact, regarded by nationalists as a disguise for continued British control.²⁶ Iraq's pro Western government was overthrown in 1958, and shortly thereafter she left the Baghdad Pact. Thus the Fertile Crescent saw the last of colonialism only seven years ago. Today, only the protectorate over the Federation of South Arabia remains.

Nasser seems determined to expel every vestige of colonialism from the Arab world. He has actively supported rioting in the Federation of South Arabia and, with Yemen as a base, trains tribesmen to wage guerrilla war against the British.²⁷ Lesser vestiges of colonialism remain. Nasser has brought pressure on King Idris

²⁶Don Peretz, op. cit., p. 129.

²⁷Hedrick Smith, "Rebellion Eases in South Arabia," New York Times, 14 Jun. 1965, p. 3.

of Libya to force out British and American military bases in Libya. Finally, the oil production facilities in Libya, the Arabian peninsula, and Iraq are operated by Western interests. Nasser probably dislikes this arrangement, but has not as yet brought great pressure to bear against it. He apparently recognizes present Arab inability to operate the industry, and he does not have the leverage to pressure these states into such a patently ridiculous move. The lesson of economic chaos caused by Iran's experiment in oil nationalization is not lost on Arab rulers.

THE QUEST FOR UNITY

The Arab League, a regional organization to which all Arab states belong, was established in 1945. If its charter members believed it might eventually lead to an Arab nation, they have been disappointed so far. It remains a loose association which has achieved some useful economic, social, and political cooperation between the states.²⁸ However, most of its meetings over the years have been boycotted by at least one member, whose identity varies with the ebb and flow of relationships. It is largely dominated by Egypt, where it is headquartered. In spite of its problems, it remains a useful forum and is the best evidence of an underlying spirit of unity.

²⁸Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity - Hope and Fulfillment, pp. 99, 122, 124, 134, 137.

Several attempts at union have been made by these Arab states, each generally bringing trouble to non-participating neighbors. In early 1958, Baathist leaders in Syria, fearing a Communist takeover, initiated the formation of the United Arab Republic by union with Egypt. Iraq and Jordan, then pro-Western monarchies, federated into the Arab Union in reply. The United Arab radio stations beamed anti-government propaganda broadcasts into Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Public riots against these governments eventually occurred, and a major international crisis resulted. The Iraqi government was overthrown by anti-Western elements. The United States and England landed military forces to protect the Lebanese and Jordanian governments against possible overthrow. The entire crisis was largely attributable to the United Arab Republic's antipathy to the Baghdad Pact which Iraq had joined and Jordan was believed near joining. This crisis faded as the status quo, other than Iraq, was guaranteed by Western force of arms.

In 1959, United Arab Republic broadcasts attacked Kassem and Iraqi Communists for allegedly trying to overthrow the union, and attacks on King Hussein of Jordan reached new heights. Meanwhile unrest in the Syrian side of the union continued to rise, and a military overthrow in Syria sundered the union in 1961. Nasser immediately accused King Saud of Saudi Arabia of engineering the plot.²⁹ Another attempt at union was made in 1963. The Baathists,

²⁹Dana Adams Schmidt, "Saudis Vow Fight to Counter U.A.R.," New York Times, 29 Apr. 1962, p. 17.

then in power in Syria and Iraq, reached preliminary agreement with Nasser on a new union of the three states. Jordan was propagandized by all three, and riots again threatened Hussein's throne. However, the Baathists lost interest when it became apparent that their party would be submerged into a popular front under Nasser's personal leadership.

The Baathists suffered identical treatment during the time of the United Arab Republic. In a few months, union talk had subsided, Nasserite riots were suppressed in Iraq and Syria, and Hussein's throne survived another threat. Today, comparative calm reigns in the area. Iraq and Egypt show signs of union, and direct their hostility toward the far-left Syrian government. King Hussein is in good graces, and Saudi Arabia's new King Faisal has a reasonable rapport with Nasser. Major emnities have been dropped to concentrate energies against the enemy, Israel.

Most Arab leaders see unity as an ideal but unity in the sense of political union seems a distant goal. The United Arab Republic was doomed from the outset by geographical separation and vast differences between the social and economic goals of the people. Syrian businessmen chaffed at increasingly strong socialistic measures. In the final analysis, individual nationalisms and vested interests militate against such unions. Poverty-stricken, over-crowded Egypt can contribute only her dynamic leader. His one-man type government is hardly acceptable to men powerful in their own right in Syria and Iraq. Is there a good reason that Iraq should

share her oil wealth with these other states when it is sorely needed at home? The answer seems obvious.

AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE

The departure of the colonial powers left a vacuum which the Americans and Russians filled in their search for Cold War advantage. These two powers have heavily competed, and some of the more fortunate states have been in the enviable, but delicate, position of receiving aid from both sides. Others, more or less fortunate depending on the viewpoint, have received help from only one great power at any given time. All the states have received help from Russia or the United States or both. Appendix 1 summarizes this aid through 1964.

The period beginning after World War II and ending about 1958, marks a time of decreasing American and Western influence and rising Russian prestige. The West started with the disadvantage of supporting Israel, whereas Russia early took a strong pro-Arab stand.³⁰ In 1952, the United States received no support for its proposed Middle East Command. Finally America settled for the Baghdad Pact, which was opposed by all the Arab states except Iraq.³¹

Egypt, claiming no success with the United States, turned first to Czechoslovakia and later to Russia for arms. Egyptian-American

³⁰Don Peretz, op. cit., p. 132.

³¹Don Peretz, op. cit., p. 133.

relations steadily deteriorated, and the United States abruptly withdrew support for the Aswan Dam in 1956. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, and Russia supplied Aswan Dam assistance. Then America's allies joined in the abortive French-British-Israeli attack on the Suez Canal, to drive another wedge in the breach. The United States strongly condemned the invasion; the Russians threatened military retaliation. The net result was greater anti-Western sentiment.

By the end of 1957, Western prestige was very low and Russia had a clear advantage. However, the growth of Russian based Communism had aroused fears, especially in Syria. In early 1958, the Syrian Baathists, motivated by fear of a Communist takeover, negotiated with Nasser to merge Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic. Anti-Western and Nasserite mobs threatened the governments of Jordan and Lebanon, which brought armed intervention by the British and Americans. Iraqi troops, dispatched to help the beleaguered governments in Jordan and Lebanon, overthrew Iraq's pro-Western government instead. Shortly thereafter the West lost the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact. The West was left with Lebanon, unviable Jordan, and Israel. "Positive neutralist" Nasser had the real power in the Fertile Crescent. Russia had aroused some suspicions; the West left no doubt. A planned effort to alienate the Arabs could have achieved little more success than Western actions had accomplished.

In 1958, a new phase began during which Communist excesses lowered Russian prestige, and the West made some improvements. Nasser outlawed the Communist Party in the new United Arab Republic; fired the leftist Syrian army chief of staff; and forced out hundreds of Russian technicians. The Syrian Communist leader soon fled to Moscow.³² The underground Syrian Communists agitated for union with Iraq, where the Communist Party was openly operating. Baghdad radio propaganda defended the Communists who were being hunted and arrested by Nasser.³³ Communist dominated "Peace Militia" in Iraq assisted in the savage suppression of Nasserites, Baathists, and other anti-Kassem groups. Five to six thousand people were arrested; many escaped to Syria.³⁴ Meanwhile the United States had resumed wheat shipments to Egypt; shipments had been suspended after the Suez crisis. Britain and France reached agreement with Egypt on the Suez Canal nationalization. Nasser, despite dependence on Russian military aid, was denouncing U.S.S.R. encroachment in the Arab World.³⁵ The Soviet press in turn denounced Nasser for persecuting Communists.³⁶ Finally, when Syrian revolutionists

³²Sam Pope Brewer, "Union With Egypt Perils Syria Reds," New York Times, 7 Feb. 1958, p. 1

³³Kenneth Love, "Fight over Syria Looms In Mid East," New York Times, 3 Jan. 1959, p. 8.

³⁴"Communist Influence Widespread In Iraq," New York Times, 5 Apr. 1959, p. E5.

³⁵Georgiana G. Stevens, "Moderation In the Arab World," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 39, 1 Jan. 1960, p. 57.

³⁶Dana Adams Schmidt, "Cairo Rules Out a Pro-U.S. Stand," New York Times, 8 Jul. 1961, p. 11.

caused the split of the United Arab Republic in 1961, Russia quickly recognized the new Syria and denounced Nasser as a dictator.³⁷

Thus, the period from 1958 to 1961 gave Arab leaders first-hand observation of Russian interference. They were left with a Communist-dominated Iraq in their midst. Nasser had been disillusioned about Russian intentions, and Russia's forceful tactics had greatly reduced Soviet influence and prestige.

A desire to eliminate Communist domination of the Iraqi government dominated the scene until 1963. Nasser warned the world of the Communist threat,³⁸ and continued his anti-Kassem propaganda. Kassem tried ineffectually to emerge from Communist control by using the army to suppress Party activities. The U.S.S.R. protested this new approach.³⁹ Iraq, which had been useful to Russia for containment of pro-West Iran, was lost to Russia. The 1963 coup put the Baathist Party in power. The Baathists executed Kassem and, for a year, ran their own blood bath which savagely took revenge on the Communists.⁴⁰

The Arab leaders had learned by experience that Russian intentions were no better than those they attributed to the Western powers who supported Israel. They had seen Syria nearly taken

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Dana Adams Schmidt, "Struggle For Mideast Now Centers On Iraq," New York Times, 4 Jan. 1959, p. E7.

³⁹Dana Adams Schmidt, "Kassim Balances Political Forces," New York Times, 23 Jul. 1961, p. 10.

⁴⁰Gordon H. Torroy and John F. Devlin, "Arab Socialism," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, p. 55.

over, cruel oppression by Communist dominated Kassem, and open interference by the U.S.S.R. in internal affairs, including scathing criticism of Nasser. The West did not intervene militarily, much to their advantage. The Arabs solved the problem of Communism and excessive Russian influence for themselves.

During the past two years, Russia and the United States have attempted to improve their images by more subtle moves; both have refrained from overt interference. Egypt and Iraq are near union. Pressures against monarchs have been relaxed. The Egyptian rapprochement with Saudi Arabia has brought a cease fire to Yemen, Nasser now greets King Hussein of Jordan like a brother. Syria, under a far-left Baathist government, is at odds with most of the Arab world. This creates a divergence in the growing unity against the common enemy, Israel. The Syrian government suppresses Nasserites and Communists; yet it openly admires the Chinese.⁴¹ Russia is not favorably impressed by Syria.⁴² Syria, Egypt and Iraq need continued Soviet support for their Russian-equipped military forces. They get it because Russia now must counter both Western and Chinese influence. The United States plays the part of the reluctant arms merchant who supplies arms to Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, while also assisting Israel. America tries to maintain an arms balance, no simple task.

⁴¹Joe Alex Morris, "Stormy Syria - Arab World's Odd Man Out," Washington Post, 25 Jul. 1964, p. E4.

⁴²Thomas F. Brady, "Baath Solidifies Control In Syria," New York Times, 24 Aug. 1965, p. 2.

After their Russian experience, the Arabs might be receptive to some modified form of Dulles' ill fated "Allied Middle East Command." An American military alliance with the Arab nations obviously runs an unacceptable risk that the arms would be used against Israel, a repeat of the Pakistan-India debacle. Israel is the ever-present Achilles' heel of Western policy toward the Arab states.

Economic aid continues to be the principal means by which Russia and America vie for favor. Russia has assured Egypt that she will continue support of the Aswan Dam, which will be completed in 1967. America continues with her massive aid program, concentrated in Egypt and Jordan.

THE BAATHIST PARTY

Reference to the Baathist Party has been frequent in the preceding discussion. It is now in power in Syria, and has governed Iraq. Its organization and goals are similar to those of the Communist Party. However, it rejects Communism itself as "an alien doctrine unsuited to the Arab world."⁴³ Points of difference with Communism include the latter's rejection of private property rights and anti-religious doctrine. The founder, Michael Afflak, has said, "Communism is deceitful because it seeks to tie Arab destiny to the destiny of another state, namely Russia."⁴⁴

⁴³Gordon H. Torrey and John F. Devlin, "Arab Socialism," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, p. 51.

⁴⁴Ibid.

Baathist socialistic goals are similar to Nasser's, and the party has led in moves by some Iraqi and Syrian politicians to establish union with Egypt. However, the experience of the United Arab Republic taught the Baathists caution. Nasser forbade all other political parties, including the Baath. The Baath disagrees with Nasser's method of personal rather than collective leadership, and this problem arises each time union is discussed. Nasser controls Communists closely. The Baath has violently suppressed them with ruthless hunts and summary executions.⁴⁵ However, in 1965, the new Baath leader, Dr. el-Razzaz said:

We are near to Chinese Communism in ideology. Democratic socialism can happen only in already developed countries--it is impossible in underdeveloped countries. We are not Communist or Socialist. Marx was interested in an industrial society, we have not reached this.⁴⁶

This concept will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

⁴⁵ Chronology, Middle East Journal, Vol. XVII, Winter-Spring, 1963, pp. 115-116, 137.

⁴⁶ Joe Alex Morris, Jr., "Stormy Syria: Arab World's Odd Man Out," Washington Post, 25 Jul. 1965, p. E4.

CHAPTER 3

THE NORTH AFRICAN STATES

These states have all achieved their independence since World War II. Morocco and Tunisia, formerly French protectorates, negotiated complete independence in 1956. Libya became an independent nation in 1952 after World War II ended Italian domination. Algeria won independence in 1962 after a protracted guerrilla war of independence against France.

An underlying spirit of Arab unity is apparent in this region also, but it is not as intense as that in the central Arab states. All share in an unrealized and very general hope for a "Greater Mahgrib," an undefined alliance or federation of the North African Arab states.¹ They have shown little interest in joining the unions, or proposed unions, which arise among Egypt and some Fertile Crescent states. Although all participate in some degree with the pan-Arabism espoused by Nasser, they do not share the eastern Arab fervor on issues such as the Palestine question. They also seem less inclined to continue strong resentment of past colonial masters. Economic and social ties are still close between France and her former colonies. The persistence of these ties is undoubtedly due to continued French assistance, and the intelligent approach taken by President De Gaulle to end the Algerian revolution.

¹Hamilton A. R. Gibb, and others, The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa, pp. 89-94.

THE STATES

Morocco, a state of eleven million persons including 400,000 French, is ruled by King Hassan II. Hassan is a near-absolute ruler who has taken some steps to increase popular participation in government, but nevertheless jailed 130 opposition leaders after disappointing election returns in 1963.² There are some indications of potential government instability. In some ways the country is worse off than it was as a French protectorate. Population growth (3.1%) exceeds the economic growth rate (2.5%). Agricultural output is down to 1955 levels and there is considerable unemployment. Great poverty exists in places and heavy rioting, with 500 deaths, occurred in March 1965.³

Algeria also has about eleven million people. The overwhelming vote for independence in the 1962 plebescite attested to Algeria's nationalistic fervor and dislike of continued French rule. Algeria is in the most dire straits of all the North African countries. Her population growth is among the world's highest. In 1964, the economy was in critical condition. Great unemployment existed, and only French aid, combined with U.S. food for a fifth of the population, prevented economic catastrophe.⁴ Civil unrest, caused by

²"Morocco Arrests 130 Leaders of Party Opposed to King," New York Times, 18 Jul. 1963, p. 1.

³Robert H. Estabrook, "Morocco Struggles Under Independence," Washington Post, 31 May 1965, p. A1.

⁴Peter Braestrup, "Algeria Chooses A Socialist Path," New York Times, 20 Jan. 1964, p. 45.

the economic crisis, was prevalent. The Berbers in the south resent Arab domination, and revolt has smouldered since military force was used to quell an uprising in 1963.⁵ The government is organized along Marxist lines which follow the Yugoslav example.⁶ Colonel Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella in 1965. It remains to be seen if he can lead this nation out of the economic and social chaos which exists.

Tunisia, a nation of four million, has a stable government under the very popular President Bourguiba. Although the press is controlled and opposition is suppressed, he is giving the people an enlightened rule.⁷

Libya is an oil rich nation of one million people ruled conservatively and almost absolutely by King Idris I. The press is controlled, political parties are forbidden, and opposition is suppressed.⁸ Oil began to produce revenues in 1962, and provided 250 million dollars to the state in 1964. This has transformed Libya from a poverty-stricken state to one of relative affluence. Thousands of poor and illiterate peasants have flooded into the cities, seeking employment in the new industry, and only a few thousand have found work. Oil riches have not, so far, significantly

⁵ Peter Braestrup, "Ben Bella to Ask Powers In Crisis," New York Times, 3 Oct. 1963, p. 1.

⁶ Joachim Joester, The New Algeria, p. 113.

⁷ "Tunisia - A Nation Transformed," New York Times, 20 Jan. 1964, p. 50.

⁸ "When A Poor Country Strikes It Rich," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. LVII, 14 Dec. 1964, p. 73.

improved the mass poverty and ignorance which exists. Unrest in a rising middle class threatens the stability of the regime. The monarchy may completely fall when the 75-year-old king dies.⁹

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

These nations do not have the complex political history and interstate relationships which are exhibited by the eastern Arab states. The East and West have competed to gain political advantage in the area. Appendix 2 summarizes the economic aid which has been provided to these states by the United States and Russia.

Algeria is the only North African state which fought a war to gain independence. The anticolonial basis of that war encouraged outside assistance to the rebelling Front Liberation Nationale (FLN). Egypt and the bordering Arab states gave the FLN very considerable assistance, thereby arousing French anger. The United States was basically sympathetic to independence for Algeria, but was in no position to take a strong stand because of her NATO alliance with the French. Nevertheless this sympathy, as well as friendly American gestures to the new government under Ben Bella, have created generally amicable relations. Since Algeria gained independence in 1962, she has received aid from the United States, Russia, and France. The Soviet bloc has equipped Algerian forces

⁹Hedrick Smith, "New Generation Restive In Libya," New York Times, 24 Jan. 1965, p. 25.

with Czechoslovak arms, and Russian tanks and aircraft.¹⁰ The Algerian FLN, although similar to Tito's party, has not tolerated the Communist Party as such, and outlawed it in 1962. Many Communists were arrested, causing a Russian protest and request for end of the ban.¹¹ Houri Boumedienne, who overthrew Ben Bella in 1965, has also arrested Communists, and drawn Russian displeasure.

Boumedienne has not significantly changed Algeria's non-alignment policy and his decision to continue accepting aid from both East and West subjects him to compromises. He has continued his reliance on economic aid from France and the United States. However, he has not shifted to a pro-Western orientation, much to the disappointment of Western leaders. He has moved to obtain continued Russian support for his military forces.¹² Russia feels this entitles her to criticize his suppression of Communists, even though it is a purely internal matter.

Boumedienne appears to be emulating Nasser's finesse at accepting aid from both East and West without giving allegiance to either. The similarity of economic circumstances and dependence on both East and West helps to explain Algerian-Egyptian rapport which is not shared by the other North African states. In May 1965, Algeria was the only North African state to follow Nasser's lead in breaking relations with West Germany over the Israeli question.

¹⁰"Algeria Mending Soviet Bloc Ties," New York Times, 25 Jul. 1965, p. 18.

¹¹"Soviet Asks End of Ban," New York Times, 5 Dec. 1962, p. 1.

¹²Michael Goldsmith, "Algier's Woos Moscow, Curbs Own Reds," Washington Post, 10 Oct. 1965, p. A18.

It is too early for certainty, but there are indications that Boumedienne will devote most of his efforts to domestic problems. This contrasts with his predecessor, Ben Bella, who occasionally meddled in problems not important to Algerian advancement.

The other North African nations follow a course largely Western oriented and more independent of the Egyptian example. As previously indicated, none broke relations with West Germany over the Israeli issue.

Bourguiba is an outspoken critic of Nasser. In 1965, he had the temerity to ridicule the capability of the Palestine Liberation Army to win a victory, and proposed peace with Israel. Nasser immediately broke diplomatic relations with Tunisia.

King Idris shows little intention of forcing British and American bases out of Libya, in spite of Nasser's displeasure. All these nations have received military and economic aid from the United States. On the other hand, Russian aid to Libya and Tunisia has been insignificant. Hassan II has accepted some military aid from Russia in 1962, after complaining that American aid was too little and too late.¹³ It is likely that Hassan II accepted this aid as a means to blackmail the United States into giving him increased American aid. Other Russian aid to Morocco has been insignificant.¹⁴

¹³"Morocco Buying More Soviet Arms," New York Times, 4 Mar. 1962, p. 22.

¹⁴See Appendix 2.

All these states have outlawed the Communist Party, although Morocco tolerates it.¹⁵

In summary, all the North African states, except perhaps Algeria, are inclined toward a Western orientation. Algeria's situation does not allow her the luxury of a positive orientation. All maintain friendly relations with Russia, but economic and cultural ties, as well as geographic location, shift the balance to the West.

15 "Moroccans Push for Constitution," New York Times, 25 Nov. 1962, p. 7.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

These states differ in many ways from those in North Africa and the Arab Middle East. Islam is about the only characteristic they have in common. They all have a long history of independence, and antagonisms which may exist toward the West are based on reasons other than colonialism.

Turkey and Iran are members of the Central Treaty Organization, an outgrowth of the Baghdad Pact. Turkey belongs to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also. Turkey and Iran, with Pakistan, are the "Northern Tier" bulwark against the spread of Russian Communism into the Arab Middle East. All three states are the scene of intense Russian-Western competition.

Afghanistan has served as a buffer state for centuries. It is relatively open to Russian encroachment and pursues a discreet neutralist policy as best it can.

THE STATES

Turkey, with a population of about 29 million, has been heavily Westernized by government policy dating back to the Ataturk revolution in 1922. Ataturk reduced the strong religious hold of the clergy on the state, and introduced a variety of reforms along Western lines. These included universal suffrage for men and women, a Western based Constitution, and judicial systems patterned on the Swiss.

Although the post-Ataturk government was democratic in form, deteriorating economic conditions and runaway inflation led to a military overthrow in 1960. A new constitution has since been enacted, elections have been held and the military has loosened its hold, although it remains watchful. Premier Demirel was recently elected in preference to the Republican Inonu, who tried a comeback based on anti-American and pro-Soviet pledges.¹

Turkey has now begun to emerge from some of the economic problems inherited from the pre-1960 Menderes regime. Nevertheless much remains to be done. The population growth rate is very high. Food output has fallen to cause severe shortages.² This has been further aggravated by migration of agricultural workers to the cities.³ The government is taking positive steps to combat these and other problems and there are reasons to believe Turkey will substantially improve economic and social conditions in coming years.⁴

Iran, ruled by Shah Rezi Pahlevi, has serious social and economic problems. Its 21 million people are 80% rural, living on the fourth of the land which is habitable. The vast majority live in near serfdom on marginal incomes, bound to a small group of absentee landlords.⁵ The Shah has instituted an aggressive

¹"Turkey - Battling a Ghost," Time, Vol. 86, 8 Oct. 1965, p. 46.

²"Turkey Set to Begin Birth Control Plan," New York Times, 2 Jan. 1966, p. 2.

³Hedrick Smith, "Turks Concentrate on Private Sector," New York Times, 27 Nov. 1965, p. 41.

⁴Jay Walz, "A Somber Turkey Marks '60 Revolt," New York Times, 27 May 1962, p. 2.

⁵Jay Walz, "Iran's Shah Leads a 'White Revolution'," New York Times Magazine, 27 Oct. 1962, p. 23.

land reform program, starting with his own lands, which has made progress in eliminating the centuries-old strangle hold of these feudal-type masters over the peasants. By the summer of 1964, the lands of 5000 villages had been redistributed, and an impact made on the remainder. However, only the peasants who own oxen, about a third, share in the land reform. The others, in the worst shape of all, see little improvement in their lot. The land reform will convert 60% of the villages to the control of small landlords. A new class of masters will emerge.⁶

Iran has severe political problems which threaten the stability of the government. The Shah's reforms, notably election and land reforms, have alienated the landlords, the upper middle class intelligentsia, much of the civil service, and the religious mullahs allied with the dispossessed landlords.⁷

However, he has the loyalty of the Army and his pervasive secret police. The Shah has sent the Army through the countryside as a combination literacy corps, agricultural corps, and health corps.⁸ He is an unusual monarch in a near-feudal society; he deliberately and obviously scorns the support of the middle and top classes. He has staked his throne on support by the peasantry, a loyal Army, and a pervasive secret police. This is a risky course

⁶Hassein Mahdavy, "The Coming Crisis In Iran," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, Oct. 1965, p. 134.

⁷Thomas F. Brady, "Shah Denies Iran Depends on U.S.," New York Times, 12 Dec. 1965, p. 1

⁸Marwan Jabri, "Dilemma In Iran," Current History, Vol. 48, May 1965, p. 277.

to follow in states where overthrow has traditionally originated in the middle classes, with Army officers of middle class origin leading the coups.

Afghanistan, although a very backward country, is one of the more stable Islamic states. There are no significant problems of excessive population, hunger, disease, or maldistribution of land.⁹ Within the past few years, King Mohammed Zahir has instituted a number of government reforms along Western lines. The recently held elections were well, and honestly run. The vote was unexpectedly heavy, considering the political apathy of the past.¹⁰ Recent riots by students demanding even faster reform were successfully handled without resort to force. The king gives every appearance of striving to build a modern state, while voluntarily abandoning his absolute rule.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

The political relationships between these states are generally amicable, and no important interstate problems exist. However, a traditional enmity exists between them and their northern neighbor, Russia. Russia regards them as within her rightful sphere of influence. The Cold War competition has had a significant effect, particularly on Turkey and Iran, who have found a powerful ally, the United States.

⁹Theodore S. Gochenour, "A New Try For Afghanistan," Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, Winter, 1965, p. 19.

¹⁰"Afghans Hit Bumps on Road to Modernized State," New York Times, 7 Nov. 1965, p. 20.

THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

Heavy-handed Russian tactics during and shortly after World War II drove the governments of Turkey and Iran into the Western orbit. Even before the war ended, Russia denounced its non-aggression pact with Turkey. By 1947, the Russians were demanding preferential treatment, rights for bases in the Straits, and the ceding of Turkish territory to Russia and Bulgaria. War appeared imminent, and Turkey became the first nation to receive major aid under the new Truman Doctrine.

Iran was subjected to even stronger treatment. When Allied troops evacuated Iran after World War II, Russian troops remained to secure the Communist seizure of Azerbaijan province and a Kurdish Communist republic. Iran was powerless to regain her territory. World opinion and the ruse of agreement to establish a Soviet-Iranian oil exploration company finally induced the Russian withdrawal. Immediately, Iranian troops recovered the provinces and the Parliament repudiated the oil agreement. Tension mounted, and, in 1949, the United States increased Truman Doctrine aid to Iran to deter Russian invasion. Thus, Turkey and Iran became firmly committed to the West four years after World War II.

Western influence continued to rise, except for the 1951-1953 period when Dr. Mossadegh controlled Iranian policies. Dr. Mossadegh achieved great popularity in Iran by nationalizing the politically powerful Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1951. A Western boycott of Iranian oil reduced Iran to near bankruptcy by 1963, and only

American aid prevented collapse. Mossadegh went too far when he caused the Shah's abdication in 1953. The Army overthrew Mossadegh, and the Shah returned triumphantly within a week. Meanwhile Turkey took part in the Korean War. Iranian-Western relations steadily improved and Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Today both nations are key members of the Central Treaty Organization and receive massive aid from the United States. Appendix 3 summarizes this aid through 1964.

Despite the foregoing, Iranian popular opinion is far from unanimously pro-Western. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 climaxed a long dissatisfaction with the political role it played. Western boycott brought an economic crisis which eventually caused the popular Mossadegh to be overthrown. American interests are heavy in the consortium which replaced the nationalized company. It is obvious that strong Iranian nationalists still resent sharing profits with Western interests, and the economic pressures which led to Mossadegh's fall are still present. Today, the United States is identified with the Shah's regime, and American influence is disliked by the considerable numbers who oppose his policies and reforms.¹¹

In the past few years, Russia has made some significant gains. Turkey has begun a cautious rapprochement in response to repeated aid offers and dissatisfaction over lack of Western support on the

¹¹Hassein Mahdavy, "The Coming Crisis In Iran," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, Oct. 1965, p. 134.

Cyprus issue.¹² In 1965 Premier Demirel announced his intent to continue this policy. The Shah of Iran accepted 38 million dollars of Soviet aid in 1963. In 1965, tensions were further reduced. The Shah visited Moscow in September, and the plan to build an Iranian steel mill with Russian assistance was announced in December 1965. Clearly, Russia's new stance of peaceful co-existence is beginning to pay dividends. The general relaxation of Russian-American tensions also provides an increased sense of security which facilitates these moves.

Afghanistan has maintained neutrality and accepted aid from both East and West. Proximity to Russia probably favors Russian influence, but Mohammed Zahir Shah has been able to pursue his modernization program without undue pressure from either side.

OTHER FOREIGN RELATIONS

Iran has bad relations with several Arab countries. Egypt broke relations with Iran in 1960 because Nasser felt that shipment of Iranian oil to Israel constituted a "de facto" recognition, although Iran has not formally recognized Israel. Iran has taken the "Cold War" against Egypt even further by providing military and economic support to the Yemen Royalists. Iraq claims certain oil-rich land near Abadan, which the Arabs call Arabistan. Friction

¹²Hedrick Smith, "Turkey Favors New Cyprus Parley With Greece," New York Times, 18 Nov. 1965. p. 16.

with Iraq also arises when Iraqi forces violate the Iranian border to attack fleeing Kurds. For these reasons, the Shah is not overjoyed at the prospect of an Egypt-Iraq union on his border.¹³

Remote Afghanistan has little to do with the Arab states and her relations with Iran and Turkey are generally good. Tensions have arisen with Pakistan over a claim to seven million Pathans within Pakistan's borders. This situation is similar to the Kashmir problem. Afghanistan is convinced these Pathans would vote to join Afghanistan if given the right of self-determination.¹⁴

Turkey has generally friendly relations with the Arab world. She supported the Algerian uprising and has reasonably good relations with Nasser. Problems have arisen because of Syria's claim to a border province, and Iraq's claim that fleeing Kurds have been given sanctuary in Turkey.

The Kurdish problem is significant to Iran, Turkey and Iraq because the Kurdish peoples overlap the borders. Turkey regards the Kurds as highland Turks, and Iran gives them considerable autonomy. Iraq alone tries to subdue them by armed force. It is not surprising that Kurds, fleeing from Iraq, find sanctuary with their brethren in Iran and Turkey. It would probably be very difficult to stop this, even if Turkey and Iran seriously tried to do so.

¹³Dana Adams Schmidt, "Iran Tie to West Found Slackened," New York Times, 31 Jan. 1965.

¹⁴"Tension Relaxed on Pathan Issue," New York Times, 20 Jul. 1963, p. 7.

CHAPTER 5

THE CHINESE POLICY TOWARD THE ISLAMIC NATIONS

The leaders of China are practical men, determined to make China a great power influential throughout the world. The Islamic nations are important to their plans because they are a part of the "countries of the world." China's leaders do not feel that her military power is needed to force a conversion to Communism; this means is neither practical nor available. China needs to furnish only the influence so that the people in these nations will rise up to achieve Communism by their own efforts.

This chapter will survey the Chinese opportunities in these Islamic nations, and follow that survey with the development of a policy which practical leaders would adopt. This policy will be examined against Chinese actions to verify or disprove its existence. Finally, an effectiveness appraisal will be made.

THE PANORAMA OF ISLAMIC NATIONS

This expanse of land from Morocco to Afghanistan abounds in opportunities for Communism. Much is desert, sparsely settled, but covering the world's greatest oil reserves. Poverty and unrest is widespread and mal-distributed oil riches have not brought social relief to the vast majority. Oil-rich nations show no great enthusiasm to share their good fortune. A shortage of arable land

and a rapid population growth create regional food shortages. Ignorance is widespread because education is just beginning to come to many of the people. It is a region where monarchies and republics exist side by side, some tranquil and others turbulent. There is a striving for unity against a background of regionalism and vested interests. Most of the countries are newly independent of colonialism; yet strong Western interests remain. The United States and Russia compete for influence in the power vacuum created by colonialist withdrawal.

The major nations of the Northern Tier, Turkey and Iran are largely under military control. Turkey is heavily westernized and firmly pro-West, despite some irritation over the Cyprus issue. Her government struggles with economic problems, and there is a wide gap between the peasants and the well-to-do. Iran's monarch woos the peasants by land reform and other social measures. He challenges the traditional supporters of the Shah, the religious mullahs, land-owners, and middle classes; and, keeps control by a loyal Army and secret police. He too is pro-West, but strong pro-West sentiment is not evident in his people. Both Turkey and Iran have suffered Russian blackmail, and are just approaching a cautious reconciliation. Afghanistan, remote and backward, is starting to modernize. She attempts neutrality while accepting aid from East and West. Conditions throughout the area give promise to Communism but Western and Russian influence is well entrenched.

The North African states, at the other geographic extreme, are not closely tied to the agitated Arab Middle East. Here too, there are social and economic problems favoring Communism, but China faces existing Russian influence in Algeria and a pro-Western orientation of the other states. Morocco appears fairly stable despite its economic problems. King Idris of Libya is obviously pro-Western and new oil riches offer social hope to his increasingly restive people. Tunisia is stable under the popular Bourguiba. Russia has had little success with these three, and China's chances are not good. Algeria is China's best hope. Economic and social conditions are bad, and her problems are similar to China's. Her government is very much like that of Yugoslavia, another rebel against Russia. Algerian military forces have Russian equipment; yet Communists are suppressed, much to Moscow's chagrin. Both the United States and France have provided major aid, and Algeria's situation forces economic dependence. China can perhaps make significant inroads, even though Russia and the West have the initiative.

Egypt and the Arab Middle East offer considerable opportunity for Chinese influence. Social conditions remain a problem. Over-crowded Egypt is making only gradual improvement. Oil rich Iraq has not yet bettered the lot of her people significantly. Resource-poor Jordan depends on Western and United Nations Aid to maintain her population, especially the Palestinian refugees. Prolonged civil war has hampered the improvements which might have been made

in Yemen after the economic chaos of the Imamate. Only Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Kuwait can claim reasonable freedom from social unrest.

The Arab states have reduced their interstate tensions over the years. They have increasingly reoriented themselves toward co-existence and a united front against Israel. The cautious build-up against Israel, if it can be maintained, will seriously threaten Israel's sovereignty, and give major problems to the West.

The East-West competition has brought only insignificant political gains to either Russia or the West. The United States has provided economic aid to all, and significant military aid to all major states except Syria, Egypt, and The Sudan. However, only Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Lebanon could be considered pro-West. Their orientation is degraded by continued Western aid to Israel, and, perhaps less importantly, by the general antipathy to ex-colonialists and their allies. The ever-present American Mediterranean fleet reminds the Arabs that the West has intervened in the past, and can still do so. The Lebanon-Jordan interventions and the abortive Suez invasion are not easily forgotten.

Russia has done no better. She has armed Egypt and Syria completely and Iraq partially. Major economic aid has been given to Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. However, the near-takeover of Syria by Communists in 1958, and excesses during Kassem's regime in Iraq have tarnished the image of Russian Communism. Russia's undisguised

displeasure at Communist oppression and past propaganda attacks on Nasser cause great caution toward the USSR. Communism is banned in most Arab countries. In 1959, Nasser said:

The Arab Communists have sold themselves to foreign influence and forfeited their standing as Arabs. They are tools in the hands of Russia and that country's agents in Iraq, Syria, and all parts of the Arab world. . . . Because of their behavior in Iraq and Syria, we can wait no longer. . . .

The stand I took against the Iraqi Communists was an Arab matter and had nothing to do with the Russians. . . . Russia lost in three weeks all the good repute she had gained among us in three years.¹

In the past few years, both Russia and America have become more subtle. This makes China's problem more difficult but the opportunity is worth exploiting.

Syria's governing Baathist party, very similar to Communism, offers an opportunity for China to gain influence. Penetration of this party by a Chinese ideology would provide a useful base for further expansion in the Arab world. There is a Baath party apparatus throughout much of the Arab Middle East.² Such a penetration must be carefully handled. The Syrian government is in disfavor in other Arab states. Nasser has been aroused into positive action against Russian-based Communism in the past; a crude approach could easily turn his wrath against Chinese Communism.

¹Abdul Nasser, as quoted by George E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics - A Concise History, pp. 158-159.

²Gordon H. Torroy and John H. Devlin, "Arab Socialism," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, p. 50.

The importance of Islam to the entire North African and Middle Eastern world cannot be ignored. Islam has a centuries-old opposition to the Western world. At the same time, it respects the religious man, whatever his faith. Islam gave a sense of values to the older generation. The younger, educated people have relegated it to a lesser role, still important as a moral base, but secondary to pursuit of the new nationalistic goals.³ Islam stands today as a factor which cannot be ignored by national leaders, much as Christian teachings cannot be ignored by Western leaders. However, it is by no means a major determinant of the national goals of these emerging states.

CHINESE POLICY TOWARD ISLAMIC NATIONS

China can profit by American and Russian errors of foreign policy toward these states. She cannot hope to match the American aid which has helped to bring Turkey and Iran into the Western alliance, or the Russian and American aid to Arab nations which has brought alliances to neither. However, China's weaknesses, skillfully applied, can work to her advantage. She too is a poverty-stricken nation, only recently emerged from a form of colonialism, according to her definition. Thus, a certain kinship can be exploited. The avowed Communist opposition to religion is quickly eliminated as an impediment, because China has a ready

³Hamilton A. R. Gibb and others, The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa, pp. 51-52.

answer. China preaches a policy of non-interference in the religious beliefs of her own Moslems,⁴ and Chinese Islamic pilgrims made the trip to Mecca as late as 1964.⁵

The succeeding discussion will hypothesize likely Chinese policies toward the Islamic nations, compare them with events, and conclude the existence or non-existence of each policy. When events do not support the policy, possible reasons for the discrepancy will be examined.

RAISE CHINESE INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE

China will raise her prestige and influence among the Islamic nations and, wherever possible, will lower American and Russian prestige.

This policy is almost self-evident in view of the Islamic nations' role as "the countries of the world" and the American and Russian interference with Chinese worldwide goals. It is a regional policy which underlies friendly relations with individual states. Many actions by China, some included under the discussion of succeeding policies, confirm the existence of this policy. For example, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the following statement on May 17, 1965:

⁴Chen-huan, Liu, "A Communist Cannot Have Faith In Any Religion," China Digest, No. 100, 12 Sep. 1963, p. 110.

⁵"Chinese Pilgrims Leave Peiping For Mecca," Communist China Digest, No. 122, 16 Jun. 1964, p. 120.

On May 13, the Bonn government of West Germany, disregarding the strong opposition of the Arab peoples, brazenly established full diplomatic relations with Israel. This is a new provocation against the Arab peoples made by West German militarism and Zionism at U.S. imperialist instigation; it is also a grave provocation against the people of Asia, Africa and the whole world. . . .

What is called Israel is nothing but a product of the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression. The whole world knows that it is U.S. imperialism which, manipulating the United Nations, artificially created Israel as a dagger thrust into the heart of the Arab world and it is U.S. imperialism which has spent billions of American dollars in rearing and arming Israel so as to threaten the independence and security of the Arab countries. . . .

The Arab people have risen like one man against the aggression and provocation of their enemies, U.S. imperialism, West German militarism, and Zionism; they have demonstrated the mettle of a heroic people and so won general praise among the peoples of the world.⁶

The leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization came back from Peking in 1965 and announced Chinese material and moral support for the cause.⁷ However, the Soviet Union has not given its support.⁸

China gave material aid to the Algerian revolutionary forces during the rebellion and after its successful conclusion. China has said:

⁶"Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement Supports Struggle of Arab Countries Against the West," Communist China Digest, No. 157, 16 Nov. 1965, pp. 103-104.

⁷Joe Alex Morris, Jr., "Arab Crusade Against Israel May Take Extremist Turn," Washington Post, 7 Jun. 1965, p. A19.

⁸"Israeli Hears of Chinese Aid to Syria," New York Times, 17 Nov. 1965, p. 5.

The Chinese and African peoples are bosom friends indeed. Prolonged imperialist aggression and plunder have reduced the Asian and African countries into poverty and backwardness. We are all friends in need, all anxious to develop our national economies after driving out imperialism-colonialism so as to throw off our poverty and backwardness.⁹

The Chinese refusal to attend the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in November 1965, best illustrates their effort to discredit Russia as a "white European nation." The intent to lower Russian prestige was clear, and Chinese intransigence caused cancellation of the meeting for which the Chinese had pushed in the past.

Chinese actions clearly confirm the existence of this policy. Additional confirmation will appear in subsequent discussion. Finally it is noteworthy that Chinese press statements reveal no attacks on any Islamic nation or ruler, whether formal relations exist or not. Neither Russia nor the United States can claim this record.

ESTABLISH FORMAL RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES

China will attempt to establish formal relations with all the Islamic nations.

The People's Republic of China already has diplomatic relations with most of these countries; only Libya, Jordan, Lebanon,

⁹"Africa Visit Will Improve Friendship, Solidarity and Peace," Communist China Digest, No. 112, 30 Jan. 1964, p. 18.

Kuwait, Turkey, and Iran now have formal relations with Nationalist China. Establishment of relations provides an opportunity directly to expand Chinese influence in individual countries.

The expectation of additional votes at the United Nations is another major advantage. Support from a substantial number of Islamic countries could well lead to a vote to seat Red China. A vote to seat Red China would cause the United States and, perhaps also Russia, considerable difficulty and embarrassment. This would add to China's prestige regardless of final disposition. Failure to seat her in the Security Council would arouse sympathy for a nation still oppressed by the great powers, and would oppose the implicit desire of those who voted to seat her; seating China would admit her officially into the fraternity of great powers. The nations which do not recognize Red China are a hard core of Western-oriented countries, all of whom receive economic or military aid, or both, from the United States.

There is no strong indication that any of the nations now recognizing Nationalist China will change to Red China in the near future. Pakistan has offered Red China her services as intermediary to try for formal relations with Turkey; the Turks say they are "proceeding cautiously."¹⁰ Further, Turkish irritation over the Cyprus question might speed up such a move; otherwise there are no overt indications of any such negotiations. Nevertheless, China

¹⁰"Chen Tells of Step For Tie With Turkey," New York Times, 29 Mar. 1965, p. 3.

maintains a friendly posture toward all these countries. As already indicated, a search of the Chinese press reveals no attacks on the leaders or people of any of these countries.

China's relations with the countries with whom she maintains formal relations are very correct. When Algeria outlawed the Communist Party in 1962, Russia was openly critical;¹¹ China made no comment.¹² Bourguiba's acid comments on Red China's trouble-making capacities drew a Chinese protest in 1965, but the Chinese press release was very mild and did not denounce Bourguiba.¹³ China promptly recognized the new Boumedienne government in Algeria, with the comment that "China does not meddle in internal affairs."¹⁴

A policy to establish formal relations with all these countries, and keep these relations friendly as an inducement to the others, is apparent.

SUPPORT OF WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

China will support rebellion and wars of national liberation directed against colonialism, neo-colonialism and independent governments not favored by China.

The support of wars of national liberation, incipient and active, against colonialism and neo-colonialism is a moral

¹¹"Soviet Asks End of Ban," New York Times, 5 Dec. 1962, p. 1.

¹²Statement based on search of available Chinese press releases.

¹³"Vilification By Tunisian President Refuted," Peking Review, 21 May 1965, p. 5.

¹⁴"China Supports Algerian Council of Revolution," Peking Review, 25 Jun. 1965, p. 4.

obligation to the Chinese. Support of rebellion and wars against an established independent government requires particular care to avoid interference in internal affairs. It would be to China's interest to support the latter when there is reason to believe the emergent government would be more favorable to China. China should take the role of supporting a friendly Islamic nation which is taking a primary part in overthrow of another government. If China undertakes a primary role, she leaves herself open to a charge of interference in internal affairs.

China gave immediate recognition to the Algerian government-in-exile in 1958; she aroused considerable friendly sentiment by providing arms to the revolutionary forces.¹⁵ Egypt and Algeria's immediate neighbors were already providing support. China has supported the Yemeni republicans,¹⁶ who overthrew the Imamate in 1962, and who continue their effort to subdue royalist tribesmen. In this case she threw her support in with that of Nasser who was already involved. There was no reason for any Arab nation to believe China instigated the revolution. Support was a safe course, even if against Saudi Arabian and Jordanian participation, because China chose the side supported by Nasser, the dominant Arab leader.

¹⁵Peter Braestrup, "Algerian Swing to Left Disturbs West's Envoys," New York Times, 1 Nov. 1962, p. 2.

¹⁶"A New Chapter In the Annals of Friendship Between The Chinese and Yemeni Peoples," Communist China Digest, No. 125, 11 Aug. 1964, p. 17.

ECONOMIC AID TO SELECTED COUNTRIES

China will provide economic aid to selected Islamic nations where her national interests are best served.

Foreign aid to underdeveloped nations has become a significant part of great power foreign policy. China, who aspires to great power status, must also provide economic aid. In addition to the goodwill which skillfully handled aid provides, it is the excuse to send large numbers of properly motivated "technicians" into the recipient country. These emissaries, unlike the diplomatic staff, can mingle with the masses with good and uncontested reason; they bring the message to the countryside. China necessarily is limited in the aid she can provide because of domestic problems. However, she has the advantage that her aid, coming from a nation little better off than the receiver, can be made to appear as true friendship and not a dependency-forming charity from a rich and powerful nation with the ulterior motive of enhancing its own position.

Appendices 1, 2, and 3 show the aid provided by China, compared to Russian and American aid. Her limited funds are carefully placed. Yemeni aid is a continuation of the revolutionary support and about 1000 Chinese technicians have been sent to Yemen.¹⁷ China gave Egypt a 4.7 million dollar currency grant during the Suez Crisis.¹⁸

¹⁷"Forgotten War In the Desert: A First Hand Report," U.S. News and World Report, 24 May 1965, p. 67.

¹⁸U.S. Dept of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1964, p. 13.

Recent reports indicate that large numbers of Chinese technicians and military advisers have been sent to Syria.¹⁹ Careful selection is indicated by the choice of states. Aid to Yemen and Egypt is calculated to gain Nasser's favor. Algerian aid also helps with Nasser and, perhaps more importantly, gives access to a Marxist type government which may be ideologically swayed. Syrian aid is a means to hedge the bet. Its Baathist regime is anti-Nasser, but its ideology is close to Chinese Communism. It is to China's interest to foster this government because Syria might become the base from which the Baathist Party, Arab Marxist with a Chinese bent, can spread to other nations. The pattern shows careful allocation of limited funds to countries where Chinese influence can best be enhanced.

The Chinese place great emphasis on the magnanimity and unselfishness of their aid. They stress principles of equality between nations, respect for sovereignty, loans with little or no interest, and long repayment terms easily extended. Emphasis is placed on self reliance rather than dependence on China, quick return investments, top quality material equal to that used in China, and technical aid to assure proper use.²⁰

¹⁹"Israeli Hears of Communist Aid to Syria," New York Times, 17 Nov. 1965, p. 5.

²⁰Nan Han-chen, "Fight Imperialism and Neo-colonialism For The Economic Emancipation of Afro-Asian Peoples," Peking Review, 5 Mar. 1965, p. 16.

PENETRATION OF LOCAL PARTIES

China will attempt to convert indigenous Communist or Marxist type parties to the Chinese ideology.

This would provide great advantage because a converted party in power controls the orientation of its own country and provides the base for expansion into other countries. Particular advantage accrues if the party is not Communist in name; stigma is avoided and there is less risk of intervention by other states or the West. Gradual conversion could be done by training individuals in China and by use of Chinese embassy personnel and technicians in target nations.

There are indications of this policy; positive proof in the form of overt statements is lacking for obvious reasons. Large numbers of Chinese are in Syria. Now, after a history of suppressing Communists, the Marxist-line Baath Party claims a new-found ideological resemblance to the Chinese Communists.²¹ The Baathists suppressed Communists violently in both Syria and Iraq, at times when the Russians guided the world movement. Now a new love affair with the Communists, certain ones, is proclaimed; China must have had a hand in this. Several Sudanese Communists have risen to prominent positions in the world movement. One, Mohammed Kheir, just returned to the Sudan, with the apparent intention of setting

²¹Joe Alex Morris, Jr., "Stormy Syria--Arab World's Odd Man Out," Washington Post, 25 Jul. 1965, p. E4.

up a Chinese-type party, after a five-year stay in China.²² The recent outlawing of the party may impede his efforts, but a fair-sized party doubtless exists underground. On the other hand, Chinese efforts to penetrate the Marxist-based Algerian FLN have not met with observable success.

The lack of known success in Algeria does not greatly detract from the proof. The Sudanese and Syrian cases give strong evidence of a logical intent to convert leftist and Communist parties to the Chinese ideology. It would be ridiculous for China to announce such intentions openly for particular countries. There are reasonable grounds for acceptance of this policy which is in line with the Chinese concept of a "national front."

PROMOTIONS OF UNREST AND INTERSTATE TENSIONS

China will promote internal unrest and interstate tensions to create conditions favorable to Communism.

This is a frequently heard goal of Communist powers. The theory seems to be that internal unrest creates disunity which favors rise to power of a highly organized, though small, Communist party. Interstate tensions add to popular unrest and favor continued existence of a Communist state, once it comes to power.

There is little or nothing to support the existence of such a Chinese policy. A search of the Chinese press reveals no such

²²"Sudan Reds Protest Move to Outlaw Communists," Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1965, p. A9.

actions or intimations of such actions. On the contrary, almost all their statements emphasize the community of Arab interests, e.g. the Arab peoples against Israel. No statements have been found to support rioting against an indigenous government; nor do their statements take sides in interstate arguments if the states are non-colonial. Thus, when Iraq was threatening to annex Kuwait forcibly in 1962, China condemned the British "imperialists" for intervening; she said Iraq's claim should be settled by the Arabs and offered no further opinion.²³ Communists have been credited with instigating riots in Jordan and other countries, but nothing indicates Chinese Communist instigation or support. It is probable that China prefers establishment and maintenance of friendly relations with existing governments, whatever their form; she leaves overt instigation of unrest to local elements. To do otherwise risks a "meddling" charge and expulsion of easily identified Chinese from the country.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE POLICY

China has made some gains in these countries. She is formally recognized by the great majority, even though the United States, which has aided all of them, opposes recognition. She has not been recognized by the two most powerful states, Turkey and Iran. Her vicious castigation of Israel coincides with majority opinion in the Arab Middle East; the moral support is undoubtedly appreciated.

²³"Kuwait's Sovereignty Should Be Left to Arab World," Communist China Digest, No. 55, 31 Jan. 1962, p. 38.

Her constant vilification of the United States may strike some sympathetic ears. However, the politically conscious population has abundant evidence that the United States has provided much economic aid with no intent to establish a United States colonialism in the area. China may have gained some stature by careful avoidance of interfering in local affairs, whereas the United States and Russia did so until recent years. She has contributed minor aid to certain nations. This aid has been comparatively insignificant, except in Yemen and Algeria.²⁴ China has apparently made a doctrinal penetration in Syria. However, it is noticeable that the leaders of these countries have not been sufficiently impressed to denounce United States designs on the area. Nor is there any indication that they side with China in her ideological struggle with Russia. They seem to follow a sensible course of neutrality in that struggle.

Islamic leaders are practical men, too. China proposes that both Russia and the United States are imperialist enemies. China agrees with Arab leaders in their enmity toward Israel. However, if these leaders denounce the United States, they risk loss of prized American aid; if they denounce Russia, they risk loss of Russian economic aid and the military aid which significantly increases their power to fight Israel.

On the other hand, China's support mostly consists of words and slogans. These sound good, but they feed no people and make no

²⁴See Appendices 1 and 2.

contribution to a military buildup. These states accept China's limited aid under its excellent interest and repayment terms; every little bit helps, and rejection of such benevolent terms would be financial irresponsibility. They know if war comes with Israel, material Chinese support will necessarily be paltry, because China can provide little real help.

The "colonialism" epithet is losing its luster. Britain and France show no interest in regaining their colonies and the United States demonstrated ten years ago that it would not tolerate a return to European control by force, even over the Suez Canal. They recognize also that the American presence in the area is directed at Russia, not the Arab countries. Nevertheless, a resentment and fear of the United States' presence is there; it is based on a fear of involvement in the Cold War that is considered none of their affair, and a fear of becoming a battleground in the event of a hot war. These leaders want to build their countries. It is Russia and the United States who can provide meaningful help, not a poverty-stricken China, bombastic and ineffectual.

China has taken on a new face since touting peaceful coexistence at Bandung in 1955. The Peoples Republic has invaded India once, and threatened to do so again during the recent India-Pakistan war. Chinese supported Communists have been credited with attempting to overthrow the government of Indonesia, another Bandung conferee. The label of internal interference is there, regardless of the accuracy.

China chose to boycott the second Afro-Asian Conference, to be held in Algiers in November 1956, rather than see Russia admitted. The majority of participating nations wanted Russian attendance.²⁵ China attempted to make these countries pawns in her ideological struggle; an accession to her demand would have forced renunciation of Russia. The conference was eventually cancelled, leaving little doubt of the magnitude of her real prestige.

The Lin Piao speech has assigned the Islamic nations a role as stepping stones for Chinese, not Islamic, aspirations. Syria alone has professed admiration for the Chinese. The possibility is great that China is betting on a loser here. Anti-government hostility is rising in Syria, and she is no stranger to coups. Neighboring governments dislike events in Syria today. The Nasserites are still strong, even if underground; Chinese Communism is just as much an alien ideology as was Russian Communism in 1958. Nasser has brought his power to bear before, and he can still do so.

Finally the present socialistic governments of many of these countries now offer all the social gains which Chinese Communism claims it provides. Changes in monarchies are more likely to follow a neighbor's example than to adopt the alien philosophy of a poor, but noisy, country thousands of miles away. This is even more likely when the philosophy glorifies a war of revolution.

²⁵"Afro-Asians Seen For Soviet Bid," New York Times, 27 Oct. 1965, p. A 26.

These countries, especially the Arab ones, generally feel revulsion toward blood-letting. Most of the coups have occurred with little real violence.

In summary, China has said a lot of words, and she has been formally recognized by most of the Islamic nations. Her alien ideology offers no advantages over political concepts already in use; the disadvantages of adopting it are economically obvious. There are no passionate pleas emerging from the Islamic world in behalf of China. No one seems much interested in her ridiculous feud with Russia, which has further degraded her own advance. One suspects that Islamic leaders see China as more of an acquaintance than a friend. The real nations to cultivate are Russia and the United States. There is no reason to believe either will allow China to reach the dominant position to which she aspires. Either has the power to stop her now or in the foreseeable future.

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INTRODUCTION TO APPENDICES 1, 2, 3

Appendices 1, 2, and 3 compare Russian, American and Chinese aid to the countries of the Arab Middle East, North Africa and the Northern Tier.


United States aid is cumulative through 30 June 1964, including both loans and grants.¹ Russian and Chinese aid (economic only) is cumulative through 1964.² (Sources of information are provided in the footnotes.)

Russian and Chinese military aid statistics are not available. In some cases, newspaper articles give an indication of the volume of that aid. Notes have been added to the charts in these cases. See the last page for explanation of those notes.


¹US Agency For International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, 30 Jun. 1964, pages for each country.

²US Dept of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1964, pages for each country.

**ARAB MIDDLE EAST
AID PROGRAMS (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
ECONOMIC**




MILITARY



NOTE: ALL INFORMATION AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

NORTH AFRICAN STATES AID PROGRAMS (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

ECONOMIC




MOROCCO [REDACTED] 451 (U.S.)

ALGERIA [REDACTED] 149 (U.S.)
[REDACTED] 229 (USSR)
[REDACTED] 52 (PRC)

TUNISIA [REDACTED] 397 (U.S.)
[REDACTED] 28 (USSR)

LIBYA [REDACTED] 205 (U.S.)

MILITARY



MOROCCO [REDACTED] 21.3 (U.S.)
RUSSIAN AID: NOTE 4

ALGERIA] NO U.S. MILITARY AID CHINESE AND RUSSIAN AID: NOTE 5


TUNISIA [REDACTED] 19.1 (U.S.)

LIBYA [REDACTED] 22.5 (U.S.)


NOTE: ALL INFORMATION AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

TURKEY, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN
AID PROGRAMS (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

ECONOMIC



MILITARY



NOTE: ALL INFORMATION AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

- NOTE 1: News report said that Russia had 900 to 1000 military advisers assisting the Yemeni republicans.³
- NOTE 2: News report in 1962 indicated that two-thirds of Iraq's military equipment had been provided by Russia, and that more MIG-21 aircraft were to be delivered soon.⁴
- NOTE 3: Russia offered Jordan supersonic aircraft in 1964. Jordan may be pressured by other USSR-equipped Arab nations to accept Russian arms as a part of the Arab buildup against Israel.⁵
- NOTE 4: Russia gave Morocco 14 MIG aircraft in 1961.⁶ Two ship-loads of Russian military equipment were delivered in 1962, including artillery, tanks and vehicles.⁷
- NOTE 5: China has a large military mission in Algeria. The USSR has modernized the weapons in the Soviet-equipped military forces, and also has a military mission.⁸

³Max Frankel, "Soviet Sharply Increases Military Aides In Yemen," New York Times, 16 Jun. 1963, p. 1.

⁴"World's Trouble Spots," Philadelphia Enquirer, (Part 12, Middle East), 20 Mar. 1962, Part 12.

⁵Patrick Seale, "Soviet Offer Of Weapons To Jordan Stirs West," Washington Post, 30 Aug. 1964, p. A35.

⁶Jack Raymond, "U.S. Cautions Morocco On Arms Aid From Russia," New York Times, 13 Feb. 1961, p. 1.

⁷"Two Shiploads Of Soviet Weapons Delivered To Moroccan Forces," New York Times, 11 Apr. 1962, p. 5.

⁸"Chinese Held Countering The Russians In Algeria," New York Times, 1 Nov. 1964, p. 14.